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A ‘Most Fruitful Period’? The North East District Communist Party and the 




The Labour Party’s growth and eventual hegemony in the north east during the 
inter-war period has been reflected by the dominance the topic has enjoyed in the 
pages of the North East Labour History Society’s journal. Though understandable, 
the lack of attention paid to the Communist Party (CP) has meant that an important 
aspect of that supremacy has remained unexplored. This article will attempt to 
address this imbalance by examining the CP in the region and assessing its 
influence in various important labour movement organisations in the popular front 
period, 1935-9.1  
 
The popular front marked a sharp change of direction from the previous policy, the 
sectarian ‘class against class’ or ‘third period’. Imposed by the Communist 
International (Comintern) in 1928, this policy demanded that communists regard 
the ‘social fascist’ Social Democrats as their greatest enemy. However, a rethink 
was forced with Hitler’s seizure of power in Germany in January 1933, which was 
ascribed by many on the left to the split in the German working class between the 
communists and socialists. So, the ‘class against class’ policy was gradually 
discarded and replaced by a renewed communist effort to co-operate with other 
parties against fascism. Initially, co-operation was limited to the ‘working class’ 
parties, but this soon broadened out to include all anti-fascists. The popular front 
strategy itself was pioneered by communists in France, where an indigenous fascist 
threat led to the French CP adopting a programme for an alliance of all progressive 
and democratic forces under the banner of a ‘people’s front’ by October 1934. The 
 
 
‘Dimitrov resolution’, passed at the Seventh World Communist Congress in 
summer 1935, brought the international communist movement into line with these 
developments. This new strategy seemed to yield dividends as popular front 
governments were elected in Spain in February 1936 and in France three months 
later.2 
 
In Britain, the urgent need was to defeat the National Government which, with its 
developing appeasement policies of the late thirties, was seen as pro-fascist. A 
popular front government, led by Labour but including Liberals, would commit 
Britain to building up a peace block of countries, an alliance with France, Russia, 
America and other democracies, which could halt fascist expansionism. This 
popular front period, which saw, amongst others, the extensive campaigns to 
support the desperate struggle of the Spanish Republican government against a 
military revolt supported by Hitler and Mussolini, has been deemed ‘the most 
fruitful period in the history of the British left and of the Communist Party in 
particular’.3 But how fruitful was it for the CP in the north east of England? 
 
CP Membership and Its Geographical Distribution  
 
Two years into the popular front period proper, in July 1937, a worried Newcastle 
trade union official reported that the CP on Tyneside was making ‘rapid progress’ 
in gaining membership.4 If the union official was not deliberately scare-mongering, 
they need not have worried too much. Though there is some discrepancy regarding 
the precise membership figures, they were hardly impressive. The maximum figure 
of 550 North East District members in 1938 represented only 3.5 percent of the 
national CP membership of 15,750 for that year.5 The district compared very 
unfavourably with another region of a similar size and socio-economic makeup, 
 
 
South Wales, which had 961 members in 1938.6 In fact, the north east’s 
membership did not even compare favourably with what it had been a decade 
previously. In 1926, at the peak of its influence (due to its more militant stand on 
the coal strike) regional CP membership had rocketed. Though the vast majority of 
new recruits soon left the party, the membership figure of around 750 by 
September 1927 was still almost half as much again as the mid-1938 figure.7  
 
Particular geographical areas of communist weakness can be highlighted. There 
was, for example, no CP organisation in the west end of Newcastle in the mid-
thirties. Thus Johnny Walsh, who had become disenchanted with the Labour 
League of Youth (LLY) and the Independent Labour Party’s (ILP) Guild of Youth 
as they were ‘only talk shops’, had to remain in the Labour Party for eighteen 
months more than he would have liked.8 However, the classic example of a very 
weak CP branch was that of Jarrow and Hebburn, the notorious unemployment 
black-spot which had, according to Ellen Wilkinson, only seven members in the 
thirties.9 Wilkinson’s claim was corroborated by a contemporary young activist, 
Barry Sparke, who claimed that in the late thirties there were only eight or nine 
people in the branch.10 Sparke attributed the diminutive size of the CP in Jarrow to 
the strength of catholicism in the town. Catholics, of course, were generally 
repelled by what was an avowedly atheist organisation. The presence of 230,394 
catholics in Hexham and Newcastle Diocese was undoubtedly a significant 
obstacle for the CP.11 Though Jarrow was the most extreme example, there were 
strong concentrations of catholics in other areas of the region, most notably 
Gateshead and Sunderland. In Gateshead, there were enough catholics in the 
Labour Party to form a group on Gateshead council and split the party over issues 




Of course, roman catholic parentage did not necessarily preclude an individual 
from becoming a communist. In fact Barry Sparke himself partly fell into this 
category as his father was a member of a Tyneside Irish family whilst his mother 
was the eldest daughter of a Protestant pitman’s family.13 In highlighting this 
overall weakness in terms of CP membership in the district, it should be pointed 
out that, as thirties communist activist Frank Graham noted of the region, ‘most 
towns and villages had a small [CP] branch at least’.14 And, of course, some 
localities had relatively strong branches. The size of Frank Graham’s own branch, 
Sunderland, was such that it recruited twenty volunteers to fight against Franco in 
the communist-organised International Brigade. This was the largest individual 
town contingent in the region, and this from a town with a substantial catholic 
vote.15  
 
Communist Influence in the Wider Labour Movement: ‘Cryptos’ and ‘Fellow 
Travellers’   
 
Though the north east CP remained numerically weak by mid-1938, it might still 
have exercised influence well beyond its size, which partly depended on the 
position and standing of communists within the wider labour movement. One way 
in which influence within the ‘official’ [i.e. non-communist] movement could be 
exerted was by those who were members of both the Communist and Labour 
Parties. This was prohibited under Labour Party rules and, due to the secrecy 
required, it is difficult to identify individuals who were card-carrying members of 
both parties. Ellen Wilkinsons’ observations on Jarrow CP are important in this 
context, as she claimed that five of the seven communists in the town ‘also held 
cards in the Labour Party’.16 Other evidence suggests strong communist influence. 
In 1936-7, a dispute in Jarrow Labour Party and Trades Council (LP&TC) led to 
 
 
the expulsion of several Labour councillors who then claimed that the split was due 
to ‘communists’ within Jarrow Labour Party.17  
 
This impression of communist infiltration of Jarrow Labour was, however, refuted 
by Barry Sparke. He claimed that there was only one ‘crypto’ in the Jarrow Labour 
Party in the thirties, William Rounce.18 However, it was quite conceivable that 
Rounce had joined many ex-communists on the Jarrow LP&TC executive who 
were still favourable to communist policies. This was implied in June 1937 by the 
Labour mayor who, whilst denying that there were any communists in the party, 
added that some may have been CP members before joining Labour.19 Either 
Rounce had a very persuasive personality or there were other ‘fellow travellers’ in 
Jarrow LP&TC as the organisation supported several communist causes in the late 
thirties.20 Yet, communist influence in Jarrow did not stretch to the divisional 
party, which did not, for example, support the popular front in 1939 (unlike the 
admittedly lukewarm support provided by its MP, Ellen Wilkinson).21 
 
Though there must have been other significant ‘cryptos’ in the region, most of the 
influence the CP exercised within the north east Labour Party was through those 
who supported the CP’s ‘line’ in the period. Presumably, many of these individuals 
were in the Labour Party rather than the CP for practical rather than ideological 
reasons, it being far more difficult, and, at times, impossible to get elected to a 
local council or trade union position as an overt communist. Henry Bolton, Andy, 
Steve and Emmie Lawther, all important ‘official’ figures in Blaydon Labour 
Party, were good examples of this.22 Through them, Blaydon Labour Party became 
the conduit through which the north east CP exercised most influence.23 Thus the 
‘official’ labour movement in Blaydon provided extensive support for the 1936 
Hunger March, and there was united front activity on Spain, in various guises, 
 
 
throughout the period.24 However, even Blaydon Divisional Labour Party (DLP) 
was not completely dominated by communist ‘fellow travellers’, and there was 
conflict between the wings of the movement, over, for example, the role of 
Blaydon Socialist Sunday School in autumn 1936.25  
 
Communist Influence in Other North East Labour Parties, Trades Councils 
and Joint Bodies 
  
Where, and in what other organisations did the north east CP exercise influence in 
the popular front period?  Of the three types of organisations, the purely 
‘industrial’ Trades Councils (like mini-Trades Union Congresses for specific towns 
or areas) were most susceptible to direct communist penetration and influence, as 
they were composed of delegates from local trade union branches (who could be 
communists, or communist sympathisers). Naturally, combined Labour Party and 
Trades Councils were also susceptible to communism by the same method. 
However, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) had acted to curb this potential threat 
by issuing the notorious ‘Black Circulars’ on 26 October 1934. Circular Sixteen 
informed Trades Councils that if they had communist or fascist delegates they 
would no longer be recognised as ‘official’. Trades Council responses to Circular 
Sixteen revealed the very limited extent of communist activity in north east Trades 
Councils even before the TUC’s crack-down. There was no communist activity, 
according to their officials, in Blaydon, Chester-le-Street, Hebburn or Sunderland 
Trades Councils. Only two, Blyth and Newcastle, reported some contact, and they 
both claimed to have rebuffed communist proposals for joint activity.26 Thus, if the 
CP was to gain in influence in the late thirties, it was operating from a very low 




One way of gauging influence is to examine support from ‘official’ movement 
organisations for the popular front, which was the major policy that differentiated 
the CP from the Labour Party in the period 1935-9. As support for the popular 
front (and united front as a first step towards it) involved Labour co-operation with 
communists, the Labour leadership vigorously opposed both. Thus, while Labour 
Party and trade union branches supporting these polices were not necessarily under 
the influence of the CP, it can be said that they shared some common political 
ground; that they were, for those years, part of the same general ‘constituency’. Of 
course, this approach only gauges what was momentary support for rapidly, and 
radically, changing communist policies. But, as this discussion is limited to the 
popular front period, comment on the longer-term influence of the CP is not 
necessary here.  
 
Probably the next most significant locality to Blaydon and Jarrow in terms of CP 
influence was Newcastle, and especially Newcastle Trades Council. Its claim that 
it had rebuffed communist approaches was in some senses disingenuous, as at its 
very heart was Tom Aisbitt, the only other identifiable crypto-communist in the 
north east in this period.27 Thus, Newcastle Trades Council figured heavily in 
almost all left wing activity of this period.28 Potentially, Aisbitt’s position made the 
CP very powerful within Trades Councils in the region. This was because 
Newcastle Trades Council was by far the largest of the fourteen organisations 
affiliated to the North East Federation of Trades Councils (NEFTC) and Aisbitt 
was the Newcastle Trades Council delegate and, briefly, NEFTC president.29 
However, this predominance in size did not allow Newcastle Trades Council to 
dictate NEFTC decisions as each Council, regardless of its size, had a single 
delegate with one vote on the NEFTC executive. In practice, Newcastle Trades 
Council’s influence was very limited: for example, in Spring 1936 Aisbitt failed to 
 
 
secure NEFTC support for the popular front Tyneside Joint Peace Council (TJPC), 
due to NEFTC delegates’ fears of communist involvement in the Peace Council.30  
 
By April 1938 two of the four Newcastle constituencies had young left wing 
Prospective Parliamentary Candidates (PPCs, Arthur Blenkinsop in Newcastle East 
and Lyall Wilkes, Newcastle Central), who appeared to be sympathetic towards the 
CP. Both supported Cripps in 1939. Wilkes had flirted with the Left Book Club in 
1938 and, unlike Blenkinsop, received the endorsement of his DLP over Cripps in 
1939. Left wing influence seems to have been slightly less overall in the Newcastle 
DLPs in 1939 than in 1938, however, as Cripps did not secure the support of two 
DLPs that had been pro-popular front the previous year, namely Newcastle East 
and North DLPs. Moreover, Wilkes and Blenkinsop did not really appear to 
represent the majority attitude of their DLPs, except for a couple of instances when 
Newcastle Labour Party representatives supported NUWM (National Unemployed 
Workers’ Movement, a communist - run organisation) initiatives 1937-9.31 Thus, 
when communists made several offers of electoral support in east Newcastle in 
October 1937, Labour reacted with open and very public hostility. In spring1938, 
the CP had enough support to organise a deputation of Newcastle Labour Party 
members to meet the city leadership regarding communist proposals for a joint 
campaign with Labour, but insufficient influence for this to amount to anything.32 
 
The next most important area for the CP was Gateshead, where the party exercised 
a small and fluctuating degree of influence in Gateshead LP&TC. Though there 
was general Labour hostility to the CP and NUWM before 1937, this did not 
prevent some members of Gateshead LP&TC from supporting the 1937 Unity 
Campaign.33 It is likely, though, that Unity Campaign supporters were, in the main, 
also Socialist League members (the Socialist League nationally being one of the 
 
 
signatories to the campaign).34 Even then, not all Socialist League members 
supported joint activity with the CP. This included, most importantly, the main 
organiser in the region, Ruth Dodds.35 The popular front received far less support. 
Only Bart Kelly, Gateshead’s Labour PPC, supported the United Peace Alliance in 
summer 1938.36 Kelly also heaped praise on the communists in September 1938, 
when he was ousted as PPC.37 However, his ejection was a consequence of his lack 
of financial backing rather than his communist sympathies. Another high-profile 
Gateshead LP&TC member who openly praised the CP in 1938 was Mayor 
Pickering, but his attitude remained unpopular in the party and there was very little 
support for Cripps’ popular front in 1939.38  
 
Wansbeck DLP, in Northumberland, contained one of the most high-profile pro-
Soviet Labour Party members in the thirties, Sir Charles Trevelyan. Wansbeck 
DLP delegate to Labour annual conferences in the late thirties, Trevelyan’s stance 
on issues such as Spain, which caused the national leadership a good deal of 
trouble, seemed well supported. Though some sections of Wansbeck DLP 
condemned the National Executive Committee’s (NEC) disaffiliation of the 
Socialist League due to its involvement in the Unity Campaign in 1937, 
Treveylan’s position did not reflect a wider communist influence within the 
party.39 Indeed, Trevelyan’s influence was insufficient for him to gain his party’s 
support for the popular front in 1938 or 1939. Newburn local Labour Party (LLP) 
seemed pro-popular front, but it was clear that the majority of the party were far 
less well disposed towards the CP than was Trevelyan, and this did not change 
during the popular front period.40  
 
After this, there were a few localities that saw even lower levels of communist 
influence. In County Durham, Durham DLP supported communist affiliation in 
 
 
early August 1936, but demonstrated that this did not necessarily translate into 
involvement in united front activity with the CP. Moves in 1938 to get the party to 
support the popular front came from the communist Hetton (Eppleton) Lodge (in 
May 1938) and in October from Hetton LLP. These moves failed, and, in 1939, 
Durham DLP endorsed Cripps’ expulsion from the Labour Party.41 B.E. Naylor’s 
claim that ‘no permanent roots, or tradition’, were established by communist 
activity in Seaham division, after it concentrated efforts there during the Dawdon 
miner’s lockout in 1929, and in the 1929 and 1931, general elections requires slight 
qualification.42 This is because a communist, George Burdess, was chairperson of 
Dawdon Lodge in the late thirties. This position obviously gave Burdess some 
influence within the lodge, though this was limited. For example, Burdess’ lodge 
nominated him as a communist candidate for the Spring 1937 council elections, but 
also nominated four other members of the lodge executive as his Labour 
opponents. The four Labour candidates were elected, which suggests both that 
Burdess’ influence within the lodge and the popularity of communists outside it 
was minimal.43 The Labour MP from 1935, Emmanuel Shinwell, appeared at times 
to be relatively left wing but he only very briefly flirted with the united and 
popular fronts. Overall, most of what Shinwell said about communists was not 
complimentary, and his attitude appeared to be the shared by most in Seaham DLP, 
which opposed communist affiliation to Labour in 1936.44  
 
Apart from a couple of individuals, such as left wing miner’s leader councillor 
Will Pearson, the CP lacked any influence in South Shields LP&TC.45 The 
organisation had taken ‘strong action’ to enforce the Black Circular 1934-5 and 
this hostility to communists did not change during the popular front period. South 
Shields LP&TC supported the United Peace Alliance and opposed Cripps’ 
expulsion, but this simply reveals that, despite the fact that the popular front 
 
 
necessitated an alliance with communists (in most of its versions, at least), this was 
insufficient to deter all those who desired an alliance with Liberals.46  
 
Across the river Tyne in North Shields and Tynemouth, the CP was a relatively 
strong force as the Labour Party was weak.47 However, the Moderates  (i.e. 
Liberals or Conservatives, depending on the locality) in the town provided more 
support for communist ventures than did the Labour Party or Trades Council.48 In 
1939, Tynemouth Labour Party supported Cripps, an important development as it 
had not previously supported the popular front. Tynemouth was a good example of 
the kind of party that would be expected to support the popular front, regardless of 
poor relations with communists, as both operated in strongly Conservative areas. 
So again, this is not necessarily evidence that communist influence was growing 
within the Labour Party in the town.49 The only event suggesting that the CP had 
some influence in the area came in early January 1937, when a communist was 
brought in by striking North Shields trawlermen and elected their leader after the 
Transport & General Workers’ Union (TGWU) refused to recognise their strike. 
Though this development alienated some the strike, begun on 4 January and ending 
in defeat nineteen days later, nevertheless suggested that communists were, in 
times of strife, not necessarily seen by rank-and-file trade unionists as pariahs. 
However, this event was unique in the region and only occurred at all because the 
official movement refused to support the strike. Vitally, it appears that this 
prominent communist involvement in a trade union struggle did not make Labour 
in the town more receptive to the communists, and thus brought no tangible 
political gains for the CP.50  
 




The other ‘Black Circular’, Circular Seventeen, required unions to ensure that 
communists did not hold official positions within their structures. Unlike Circular 
Sixteen, the TUC could not enforce it, and it was ignored by many unions who 
were angered by the TUC’s attempted incursion into their internal operating 
procedures. Thus, the CP had more opportunities to gain positions of influence 
within the trade unions. In practice, though, this does not appear to have occurred 
to any significant extent in the north east.  
 
In terms of size (around 125,000 members) and influence, the Durham Miners’ 
Association (DMA) was the most important trade union in the north east. 
Therefore, if the CP was to exercise any degree of influence within the regional 
trade union movement it was incumbent upon it to have a significant presence 
within the DMA. Theoretically, the CP could have exercised a reasonable degree 
of influence within the DMA, due to the Durham coalfield journals it published in 
the thirties. The DMA Monthly Journal was launched in April 1938 and, whilst not 
‘official’, it did have the ‘blessing’ of the DMA executive. Communist 
involvement was revealed by the fact that George Burdess (of Dawdon) published 
it. Though not an out-and-out communist propaganda journal, presumably because 
this would have lost it the DMA’s ‘blessing’, the CP had some input, such as 
advertising for the communist-run ‘People’s Bookshop’ in Newcastle.51 The 
journal also included articles by left wing miners such as George Harvey and Will 
Lawther, and was still being produced well into the Second World War.52 An 
earlier publication, the Durham Mineworker of 1934, was produced by the 
unofficial ‘Durham Miners’ Campaign Committee’, which is likely to have been a 
communist-inspired organisation too.53 Production of both of these journals would 
have shown that the CP could contribute constructively to the development of the 
union and that its members were competent, trustworthy and useful trade unionists. 
 
 
As important, the journals went some way in demonstrating that, at least as far as 
the CP was concerned, the sectarianism and bitterness of the ‘class against class’ 
period was over. 
 
An indication of communist influence within DMA lodges during the popular front 
period is given by lodge votes on resolutions at DMA council meetings, though 
there were very few occasions in the late thirties when there was a lodge vote on an 
overtly ‘communist’ issue. One such occasion was the vote on whether the DMA 
should support the 1936 Hunger March in autumn 1936. The proposal received 153 
votes, and was soundly defeated by a majority of a little over five to one (644 votes 
were cast against). The only other similar vote in the period came in March 1937, 
when a Marsden resolution urged the unions to call a general strike if the 
government refused to supply arms to the Spanish Republic in its fight against 
Franco. The vote of 158 in favour was almost identical to the early Hunger March 
vote and was another five-to-one against vote (663 votes were cast against).54 
There were no DMA lodge votes on the united or popular fronts, but these two 
votes suggest that the CP was not in a position to influence a majority lodge vote.  
 
If anything, the CP was more influential on the DMA executive than it was in the 
lodges. Left wingers Pearson, Tom Pigford, Harvey and others were elected to it 
for six-month periods in the late thirties.55 In addition, two newly elected full-time 
agents, Will Lawther and Sam Watson, were known to be sympathetic to the CP, 
(though they were not party members). The executive certainly supported the 
united front, theoretically at least, seconding the proposals for CP affiliation to 
Labour at the 1936 Miners’ Federation (MFGB) conference and, in the form of 





However, the only practical united front activity that occurred came in August 
1936, when the DMA invited the CP to attend its anti-Means Test demonstrations. 
The political fall-out created by Conservatives in the aftermath of the 
demonstrations helped sour the atmosphere and so, only a few months later, the 
executive decided against supporting the NUWM Hunger March. A communist 
claim that only one vote determined the executive’s decision cannot be verified 
from the DMA minutes, but it appears unlikely given the way that the issue was 
dealt with by the executive at DMA council.57 So, despite having a theoretical 
commitment to the united front in 1937, there was no official DMA support for the 
Unity Campaign. Sam Watson was the only DMA agent involved (not even the 
other left wing agent, Will Lawther, took part).58 Clearly, communist influence 
within the DMA executive was only sufficient to secure paper support for the 
united front 1936-7, at a time when the Miner’s Federation as a whole also 
supported the proposal. There was no whole-hearted DMA commitment to the 
united front, thus the union only once, in summer 1936, went beyond theoretical 
support to practical united front activity. 
 
The DMA executive was even less supportive of the popular front. Only Will 
Pearson was an overt popular fronter in 1938, and not one full-time DMA official 
figured. In 1939 Will Lawther and Sam Watson became prominent supporters of 
Cripps’ campaign but there was still no official support for the policy, which 
contrasted with the earlier united front. The other DMA agents either remained 
silent or supported the Labour Party NEC against Cripps. The DMA did not 
reprimand Lawther and Watson, who were permitted to continue supporting Cripps 
and, as with the United Peace Alliance the year before, resolutions on the topic 
were not allowed to appear. This minimised division within the union and ensured 
 
 
that there was no lodge vote. Had there been one, it would surely have been a 
crushing defeat for Cripps.59  
 
The lack of influence the CP had in the DMA was also reflected by the paucity of 
Durham miners on the district committee. Only George Reay, of Boldon Lodge, 
had an executive position in a Durham lodge.60 The CP had had more influential 
figures within the DMA but, by the late thirties, they had lost their relative 
positions of influence.61 This was true of communist councillor Jim Ancrum. He 
was nominated as chair of Felling Lodge in 1931 but Robson, the DMA secretary 
of the time, wrote to the lodge claiming that communists could not stand. This 
false allegation apparently ‘confused’ the miners and Ancrum was narrowly 
defeated.62 Other members of the district committee in the late thirties were also 
ex-miners. George Short worked in the mines until 1926, and then became a 
labourer. Returning from the Soviet Union in 1931, he started as a full time worker 
for the CP on Teesside. In 1938, ‘after consultation with the party’ he got a job in 
industry.63 Charlie Woods, though a miner for most of his life, worked 
intermittently outside mining for short periods in unskilled or semi-skilled work in 
the building and engineering industries.64 Crypto-communist Tom Aisbitt’s first 
trade union position was chairperson of Team Valley miners, County Durham. He 
then became chairperson of South Pelaw Lodge and was associated with the 
Industrial Unionist movement in the Durham coalfield. By 1936 he was an 
Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers (ASW), member.65 
 
Another measure of the lack of communist influence in the DMA is the fact that 
only a handful of the 121 in the north east contingent of the International Brigade 
were from the Durham coalfield. (Having contacts who were communists was 
important for those who wished to volunteer). The trade union membership of 
 
 
communists who volunteered from the region (many originally from the north east 
volunteered from elsewhere, normally the south east where they had moved for 
work) gives some indication of where the CP’s relative strengths were: primarily in 
the general and municipal workers’ union (NUGMW), with lesser numbers in the 
TGWU, seamen (NUS), Northumberland miners (NMA) and shop workers’ unions 
(NUDAW).66 Out of these, communist influence was perhaps greatest in the NMA, 
which behaved in a similar way to the DMA. It supported communist affiliation to 
Labour in 1936 and there were NMA delegates at a united front Spain meeting in 
September 1936 and at the first major regional Unity Campaign meeting in March 
1937. It, too, did not provide any support for the popular front, and none of its 
main officials appeared especially pro-CP.67 The most significant communist in the 
union was William Allan, chairperson of Cambois Lodge. Though the regional 
NUGMW leadership, especially Yarwood and councillor J. Middleton (president 
of the district), were open anti-communists, the CP or Labour left appeared to 
control a handful of NUGMW branches.68 In contrast, the district committee of the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) appeared to be slightly left leaning (the 
AEU nationally supported CP affiliation to Labour in 1936). William Hepple 
seemed the most left wing member of the district committee, as he figured at a 
Unity Campaign meeting in March 1937 (and there were other AEU delegates on 
the platform).69 The most prominent communist in the regional NUS was Alex 
Robson, based in North Shields.70 Finally, as mentioned above, there were the 
crypto-communists Aisbitt and Rounce in the ASW. Thus, whilst the CP was 
particularly weak in the DMA, which was important given the union’s size and 
influence, it was not significantly influential in any other union in the region, and 
this despite the claim by the worried Newcastle trade union official in July 1937 
that the CP ‘is increasing its influence in the unions’.71 If its influence was 
increasing, then it was doing so from a very low base. One problem for many 
 
 
communists was unemployment, which effectively ruled them out of exercising 
influence in trade unions. This was the case for important Blyth communist Bob 
Elliott who was an unemployed miner for a long period prior to his departure for 
Spain in 1937 where he was killed fighting in the International Brigade.72 
 
The ‘Failure’ of the North East CP in the Popular Front Period  
 
The main indicator of the failure of the north east CP to increase its influence 
within the wider labour movement and beyond in the popular front period is 
revealed by its membership figures. As noted at the outset, the membership in mid-
1938 compared unfavourably with other similar regions of Britain and even with 
membership a decade previously in the north east. Worse was to come as, far from 
increasing in the year leading up to war (as South Wales membership did, to 1,056 
by May 1939), membership figures in the north east actually decreased. This 
unwelcome development did not escape the notice of the CP’s national leadership. 
William Rust, in a report on party organisation to the Central Committee in March 
1939, noted that the north east had lost fifty members and highlighted Newcastle as 
one of the ‘weak areas from the point of view of the party’.73 The north east 
representative Hymie Lee could do little but accept that on Tyneside, ‘a great 
industrial area’, the party was ‘extremely weak’.74 
 
The only other decline was in Scotland, which already had a large membership. 
Thus, whilst a decline there was disappointing, it was not disastrous. Equally, a 
small increase in South Wales would perhaps be expected as the party was already 
strong there. Rust also noted that in South Wales the syndicalist dimension of 
political culture meant that the average communist did not attach as much 
importance to the party as to the union.75 The north east did not have these 
 
 
excuses: the membership decline was a disaster for the regional party. Already 
relatively low in mid-1938, it seemed inconceivable that the figure could do 
anything but increase. Somehow, the North East District had managed the 
apparently impossible. 
 
Why Did the CP ‘Fail’ in the North East in the Popular Front Period?  
 
The main reason the CP failed so badly in the north east in the popular front period 
is bound up with the long-term development of the Labour Party in the region. 
Labour support in the north east had grown from Methodism, trade unions and co-
operatives, with Labour building on Liberal foundations. The CP could not gain a 
foothold.76 In this sense the region was similar to West Yorkshire: in both regions 
the Labour Party had ‘established a dominant position amongst the industrial 
working class and had become the main vehicle for workers to express their 
political voice’.77 In addition, and similar to Lancashire, the strong non-conformist 
and catholic elements of the north east populace were alienated by communist 
atheism.78 Thus, George Aitken, reporting on the district in November 1936, 
recognised that it had ‘been looked upon as one of the most backward districts of 
the Party for many years’ and he used, with some justification, the adjective 
‘backward’ several more times in his report to describe the north east.79  
 
The reasons for the nation-wide Labour hostility towards communism are broadly 
applicable to the north east. These were, according to Fenner Brockway, disruptive 
communist tactics which had caused labour movement leaders a lot of nuisance 
over many years; a dislike of the dictatorship in Soviet Russia; distrust of 
communists due to their reputation for double-dealing and disloyalty, and 
opposition to the imposition of communist policy from abroad.80 Many of these 
 
 
aspects were expressed in a speech by John Yarwood, a north east NUGMW 
official, in July 1937. Yarwood castigated communists as ‘glib-tongued tools of 
Moscow’ who, he claimed, were ‘responsible for recent dissension’ in the north 
east labour movement: ‘the trouble-makers in our midst must be dealt with with 
[sic.] an iron hand [...] and sent back to their sponsor to admit the ignominious 
failure of their underhand tactics. What reasonable negotiation could not 
accomplish, anarchy [sic.] could never do’.81 Presumably, the majority of those in 
the official north east labour movement shared Yarwood’s sentiments.  
 
However, there is strikingly little evidence of overt anti-communism in the 
speeches of north east labour movement activists in the popular front period. 
Perhaps the ‘threat’ was so negligible in the region that official movement leaders 
generally did not deem it worthwhile to spend time condemning communists. 
Certainly, there was no evidence of anti-communists in the labour movement 
publicly citing the Show Trials in the Soviet Union to reinforce their case against 
communism, an important factor in undermining communist influence within the 
labour movement nationally.82 A diminutive communist presence in the region 
meant that many in the official labour movement had had little practical experience 
of communists, especially in the sectarian ‘third period’, which probably would 
have fortified what the national leadership had said about them. Thus only a few 
important north east Labour leaders denounced communism between 1935 and 
1939, and only one DLP, Bishop Auckland, disciplined members who were 
involved in the Unity Campaign with communists. Prominent regional Labour 
figures who were involved in extensive activity with communists, like those in 
Blaydon, were also left alone. The Labour leadership in the region was either more 
tolerant of dissent than the national one or was less paranoid about the threat of 
communism. Of course, it is easier to be tolerant of a potential threat if you do not 
 
 
regard it as such, or are not even aware of its existence.83 Another part of the 
historical problem for the CP was that the left wing within the regional Labour 
Party was also small. And even part of that did not appear particularly supportive 
of co-operation with the CP.  
 
Specific developments within the popular front period also served to make things 
more difficult for the CP. By 1935 the national labour movement leadership had 
developed an increasingly intolerant attitude to communists (as shown by the 
‘Black Circulars’) and its attitude must have had a significant impact on those of 
labour movement activists in the region. Moreover, the national leadership was 
sometimes prepared to take drastic action against dissenters. For example, the TUC 
‘warned off’ Felling Trades Council from being involved in an NUWM conference 
in spring 1936.84 The knowledge that they were possibly being scrutinised by their 
leaders and would be admonished for misdemeanours must have acted to further 
build antipathy towards communists. Yet the ‘control freakery’ of the national 
labour movement leadership depended on a strong degree of rank-and-file loyalty. 
Generally speaking, loyalty to the official movement as embodied by its national 
leadership was very strong in the north east. Loyalty meant that national leadership 
decisions were largely adhered to. Loyalty did not mean that labour movement 
organisations in the region agreed with everything that the national leadership said 
and did, but it was a factor that kept CP influence small. In his anti-communist 
speech in July 1937 Yarwood noted that even the CP admitted that ‘thanks to [...] 
loyal membership, they are making little or no progress in our union’ [the 
NUGMW].85 Even where the CP looked to be making inroads, such as during the 
North Shields trawlermen’s strike of January 1937, respect for communists as trade 
unionists did not appear to translate into positive support for their polices or an 




Hampered by the historic failure of the CP to develop into a vital force in the north 
east, the party should still have done better in a period which is widely reckoned to 
have been one of its most successful. Thus part of the explanation for its failure 
must be the popular front policy itself and the way that it was implemented on the 
ground. Firstly, it is pertinent to note that the popular front appeared to be 
generally well supported and systematically implemented by the north east CP. 
There certainly appeared to have been no internal communist opposition to the 
policy in the region. As has been shown, in many localities the party made 
repeated and sustained attempts to encourage joint activity with Labour as the first, 
and most important, step to the popular front. However, at times certain 
communist’s activities appeared to be aimed at aggravating relations with other 
prospective allies. For example, Burdess’ behaviour at Seaham in spring 1937 was 
hardly likely to stimulate trust and co-operation with Labour. In that case the CP 
was the antagonistic party, unrealistically expecting another political party to fund 
a campaign against itself. Yet, Burdess’ behaviour was far from characteristic of 
the north east CP in the period. In most cases its members made every effort to 
build co-operation with potential allies.86 
 
Though the popular front policy appears to have been accepted and attempts made 
to implement it, some communist energies were clearly diverted from this task. A 
problem affecting the CP nation-wide was that the conflict in Spain acted as a 
distraction from the advocacy of the popular front. In October 1937 the CP Central 
Committee recognised that half of CP branches had not even attempted to get local 
labour movement bodies to approach the Labour Party about allowing CP 
affiliation to it: CP branches were more involved in ‘Aid Spain’ campaigns and the 
Left Book Club.87 The urgent needs of Spain must also have meant that a great 
 
 
deal of communist energy in the north east was devoted to the various ‘Aid Spain’ 
campaigns, many of which did not yield political benefits for the party.  
 
Yet the main problem for the popular front policy was that it was simply not that 
popular within the wider north east labour movement. There was very little Labour 
Party support in the region for either the united or the popular fronts. Both, in fact, 
drew less support and had less of an impact in the region than they did nationally. 
Worse still, not only was this support low, it appeared to be declining over the 
period. Though unimpressive, there was more Labour Party support for the Unity 
Campaign in 1937 than for the popular front campaigns that followed, and the 
1938 United Peace Alliance appeared better supported than Cripps’ campaign in 
1939.88 The unpopularity of these policies can be partly explained by the same 
reasons why the CP traditionally had found it difficult to establish itself in the 
region.89  
 
It is clear that, for the majority in the official labour movement, the pressing needs 
of Republican Spain meant that the conflict acted as a distraction from the popular 
front rather than an adjunct to it. ‘Official’ activists’ energies were concentrated in 
‘Aid Spain’ activities, which were generally well supported in the north east, 1936-
1939. It is noteworthy that the communist-supported Unity Campaign in 1937 
could not muster anywhere near the same kind of support that ‘Aid Spain’ 
activities had the previous autumn, and this situation did not change. The problem 
for communists here was that there were outlets for this ‘Aid Spain’ activity within 





Notwithstanding this, many ‘Aid Spain’ campaigns allowed communists to come 
into contact with ‘official’ labour movement activists and this should have led to 
increased CP influence.91 Communists worked with Labour Party members and 
others in some Spanish Medical Aid committees and the Basque Children’s Hostel 
in Tynemouth, for instance. Yet, in the vast majority of these individual 
organisations, the campaigning message was a humanitarian one, to ‘save the 
innocent starving women and children of Spain’, rather than a political one (‘save 
the Republic from fascism’). As the politics of the Spanish situation was 
downplayed, so the politics of those involved in these campaigns also did not come 
to the fore. The most striking example of this was the Tyneside foodship campaign 
of December 1938 to March 1939. It was the largest and most politically diverse 
‘Aid Spain’ campaign in the region, and communists were involved.92 However, 
this was at precisely the same time as the CP’s membership in the north east was 
declining. It was no wonder then that Hymie Lee complained to the Central 
Committee that ‘in all the mass activity we are hiding the face of the party. 
Communists are working everywhere but they don’t show that they are 
communists’. It was also no coincidence that he added ‘there is no feeling about 
the party growing’.93 Of course, the ‘political’ demonstrations that the CP mounted 
for arms to the Republic; the campaigns it helped organise which were framed in 
explicitly political terms or demanding a change in government policy; the support 
the Republic received in the pages of the Daily Worker and the fact that the CP 
organised the International Brigades, must have brought the CP recruits and 
influence.94 But it seemed that more energies were devoted to humanitarian 
campaigns that did not, for the very reason that they had a humanitarian basis, 




Could a policy other than the popular front have served the CP better in the north 
east in this period? Possibly, yes. There was widespread disquiet within the north 
east over foreign affairs in 1938. In fact, almost the entire ‘official’ north east 
labour movement desired an emergency conference of the national labour 
movement on Spain or the general international situation by mid-1938. More 
significantly, in June 1938 the NEFTC, Northumberland and Tyneside Federation 
of Labour Parties and Co-operative Party called for a national labour movement 
conference ‘to formulate industrial and political action to remove the Chamberlain 
government’ [my emphasis].95 This call for industrial direct action was highly 
significant, coming, as it did, from a region that was normally considered 
‘moderate’. This call placed the north east far to the left of the national leadership 
of the movement. However, and unfortunately for the CP, the appeal to Liberals 
and the middle class in general inherent in the popular front strategy required the 
party to tone-down its policies and rhetoric. Thus it no longer advocated industrial 
direct action for political ends, at a time when such a policy would have had a 
significant resonance in the regional official movement. For a significant section of 
the official labour movement rank-and-file, the popular front policy was simply 
‘too Liberal’ to have any appeal. Regional disaffection did not lead the official 
movement into the arms of popular fronters, or the communists, partly because the 
communist policy was now too right wing. This point should not be 
overemphasised, however. Given the difficult historic constraints that the CP was 
working under in the region, it is unlikely that it would have emerged to make a 
direct challenge to Labour’s political hegemony. However, a more militant policy 
attempting to encourage industrial direct action and a more forceful and open 
political presence in the ‘Aid Spain’ campaigns would surely have at least 
increased the party’s profile, membership and influence. In other words, if the CP 
had followed a policy that did not involve as many political sacrifices to the desires 
 
 
of liberals, it would surely have fared better in the north east, and, perhaps, in other 
Labour-dominated regions of Britain as well.96    
 
Finally, there is a third set of reasons for the north east CP’s failure which are 
based on its own self-inflicted internal problems and failings. With all the long-
term difficulties for the party, and the problems that the popular front policy posed 
in the north east, the fact that there remained some residual sectarianism in the 
north east CP made life even more difficult for the party.97 There was also some 
apathy and complacency in the region, which was partly a reason for and also 
partly a consequence of the north east party’s problems. This was recognised at 
national level and angered the leaders. Discussing the sales of communist 
pamphlets on agricultural questions in February 1938, Harry Pollitt criticised the 
district, identifying the north east and Birmingham, as ‘the districts where the 
situation is the least satisfactory’.98 Even when there was an apparent minor 
success, it seemed that the North East District contrived to squander it. In 
December 1937, Dave Springhall reported that membership in Newcastle had 
‘grown appreciably’ in the past eighteen months. However, he complained that 
almost half of those who had applied to join on the occasions of recent big 
meetings, and in connection with a ‘pageant’, were still ‘not yet consolidated’. This 
suggested to Springhall that complacency was ‘rife’.99 The district leadership was 
largely drawn from the area, which must have been advantageous, though it 
seemed a strange decision to send George Aitken to comment to the Central 
Committee on developments in the region at an important moment (November 
1936), when he had only been in the district ‘a month or two’.100 
 
It was clear by March 1939 that many of these problems had not been dealt with. 
At a Central Committee meeting, Hymie Lee referred to the apathy in the district 
 
 
and the ‘difficulty in getting branches to take up popular issues facing the 
people’.101 He also noted the reluctance inside the party to discuss its organisation 
and growth and the ‘disparity between membership and influence’ in the party. On 
the question of the development of new members in the district he had ‘found that 
the great majority of the work is being done by comparatively new people’. 
Finally, Lee, too, identified ‘a great deal of sectarianism in the Party’. Implicitly, 
Lee accepted part-responsibility for many of these failures, though the central 
leadership were not blameless, as far as he was concerned, in this litany of failures. 
Outlining the problems of small CP districts, Lee suggested that these could be 
overcome by introducing ‘more political life’ into the party. Here, the leadership 
had been lacking: the North East District had only received two visits from Central 
Committee members since the 1938 Congress and during one of these, the visitors 
had spoken at a meeting and ‘left immediately after it’.102 Whatever the reasons for 
the CP’s failure, its experience in the north east 1935-1939 certainly does not 
suggest that the popular front period was the ‘the most fruitful period in the history 
of  […] the Communist Party in particular’.103 If this period truly was ‘fruitful’, the 
lean times must have been unimaginably barren.  
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